Moral reasoning in adaptation to climate change by Adger, N et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://rsa.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fenp20
Download by: [University of Exeter] Date: 27 February 2017, At: 02:38
Environmental Politics
ISSN: 0964-4016 (Print) 1743-8934 (Online) Journal homepage: http://rsa.tandfonline.com/loi/fenp20
Moral reasoning in adaptation to climate change
W. Neil Adger, Catherine Butler & Kate Walker-Springett
To cite this article: W. Neil Adger, Catherine Butler & Kate Walker-Springett (2017):
Moral reasoning in adaptation to climate change, Environmental Politics, DOI:
10.1080/09644016.2017.1287624
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1287624
© The Author(s). Published by Informa UK
Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Published online: 20 Feb 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 172
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
Moral reasoning in adaptation to climate change
W. Neil Adger , Catherine Butler and Kate Walker-Springett
Geography, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
ABSTRACT
Moral foundations theory argues that moral reasoning is widely observed and
fundamental to the legitimacy of relevant governance and policy interven-
tions. A new analytical framework to examine and test how moral reasoning
underpins and legitimizes governance and practice on adaptation to climate
change risks is proposed. It develops a typology of eight categories of vulner-
ability-based and system-based moral reasoning that pertain to the dilemmas
around adaptation and examines the prevalence of these moral categories in
public discourse about speciﬁc adaptation issues. The framework is tested
using data on climate change impact, adaptation, and societal responsibility,
drawn from 14 focus groups comprising 148 participants across the UK.
Participants consistently use moral reasoning to explain their views on climate
adaptation; these include both vulnerability-based and system-based fram-
ings. These ﬁndings explain public responses to adaptation options and
governance, and have implications for the direction of adaptation policy,
including understanding which types of reasoning support politically legiti-
mate interventions.
KEYWORDS Climate change adaptation; moral reasoning; moral foundations; focus groups; climate
justice
Introduction
Adaptation to the impacts of climate change throws upmultiple social dilemmas
that involve moral and justice issues. These include: who gains and who beneﬁts
fromadaptation strategies, trade-oﬀs betweenmitigation and adaptation, and the
legitimacy of collective and governance responses. Much research and public
discourse that addresses questions about justice and morality, however, over-
whelmingly focus on responsibilities for sharing of eﬀorts on mitigation of
greenhouse gases. There are diverse ways to analyze alternative conceptualiza-
tions of climate justice, and indeed of explaining the dominance of particular
issues (e.g. Vanderheiden 2011, Grasso 2013). At the heart of climate justice is
recognition that human-induced climate change involves the imposition of
unforeseen and unknown consequences on present and future societies. Hence,
the dominant normative discourse of climate justice tends to focus on reducing
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the causes of climate change and not imposing harms associatedwith its impacts,
rather than addressing the concerns relevant to adaptation.
At the same time, a number of more speciﬁc moral or ethical issues
have been raised about the governance of adaptation, such as those of
representation and giving voice for vulnerable and marginalized popula-
tions, and representation of nonhuman nature (Adger et al. 2011; Adger
and Nicholson-Cole 2011, Hale et al. 2013, Eriksen et al. 2015). The
analysis here therefore seeks to expand the scope of climate justice
research, focusing speciﬁcally on moral arguments and their prevalence
in public discourse about climate changes impacts and adaptation.
In previous research, it has been argued that moral dimensions of public
discourse about climate change give salience and political legitimacy to policy
interventions as well as their processes and outcomes. Moreover, there is
evidence that moral framings of public policy issues aﬀect engagement
according to political orientation. That is to say, diﬀerent forms of moral
framing resonate to a greater or less extent with diﬀering political rationalities
(Skitka and Bauman 2008, Feinberg and Willer 2013, Vainio and Makiniemi
2016). If that hypothesis holds true, then it is important to examine how
moral framings appear in public discourse and the diﬀerent forms that they
take in order to better understand issues of political legitimacy. Here, we
analyze deliberative discussions with members of the public to examine the
ways that people reason about the need for and relative importance of climate
change adaptation, compared to other policy issues. We identify multiple
interpretive moral discourses through which people give meaning to the
issues, and frame what is at stake with regards to climate adaptation.
Here, we build from the core insight of moral foundations theory; that is,
that moral framings are prevalent in discourse about many policy dilemmas,
and importantly are highly diverse. We develop an analytical framework of
moral reasoning that distinguishes between what we term systems-based and
vulnerability-based conceptions, and test the validity of the resulting typology
using data from public discourse on the topic. We show that diverse forms of
moral reasoning, which appeal to both vulnerability-based and system-based
conceptions of morality, are relevant in lay reasoning about the relative
importance of adaptation as a public policy issue. Finally we discuss how
the presence, absence, and even dominance of diﬀerent moral framings have
signiﬁcant implications for the governance of adaptation.
Moral framing, values, and foundations
Environmental values and action on climate change
A large body of work has examined the relative importance of moral
framings for generating action on climate change at both individual and
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collective scales. For example, within debates about pro-environmental
behavior and attitudes around climate change there is a core set of concerns
about the implications of framing. Part of this debate is on the relative
importance of appealing to instrumental values – such as economic ration-
ality – versus moral or ethical descriptions of the environmental issue (e.g.
Markowitz and Shariﬀ 2012). Sometimes, it seems, pro-environmental
behavior is completely absent, even when it is self-evident that there are
good economic reasons to act. In other words, economic rationality is
limited in its ability to produce optimal environmental outcomes, even in
the circumstances of perfect markets and perfect information. Of course in
reality major resource issues such as climate change, the use of polluting
energy sources, and land use change do not operate with perfect markets
and perfect information. Rather they are characterized by pervasive market
failures. Hence, it would seem that appeal to instrumental values and
private economic rationality are even more severely limited as solutions
to climate change challenges.
Many disciplines and studies explain lack of pro-environmental beha-
vior according to problems of moral and ethical connection (Butler
2010). For instance, Markowitz and Shariﬀ (2012) argue that the abstract
intangible nature of climate change dampens emotional reactions and
fails to activate our moral intuitions. Numerous social theorists point out
how the lack of causal connections in relation to complex, large-scale,
contemporary hazards like climate change, limits the possibilities for
moral accountability (e.g. Beck 1992, Jamieson 2007, Giddens 2009).
Butler et al. (2015) highlight how this aﬀects the social embedding of
the moral imperatives that shape action for climate in contrast to where
there are direct connections to impacts, such as physical violence toward
others. That is to say, the wrongness of imposing harm on the health of
others by driving a high-emission car does not invoke the same moral
social response as that of directly and physically assaulting an individual
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, Butler et al. 2015). Other research has shown
how frames that appeal to moral principles or ideals are likely to have
deeper resonance and better outcomes for social action on climate change
than those using economic rationales (Corner and Randall 2011). All
these points suggest that, in the context of climate change mitigation,
moral arguments have greater potential for motivating change. Morals
matter, it is argued, because if issues are not perceived as moral, then the
impetus for action is signiﬁcantly diminished (Giﬀord 2011).
In general then, the signiﬁcance of moral engagement, or lack thereof,
with climate change as a premise for mitigation action is a central concern
of social science in this area. The concern with, and indeed the advocacy of,
the moral imperative of action on climate change, is based on the notion
that when individuals are morally engaged with an issue, they are more
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likely to act, acquiesce, or vote on it, even without scientiﬁc arguments or
economic incentives.
Moral reasoning and public policy
Moral foundations theory argues that moral values aﬀect both private action
and collective action within the public sphere. The research in this area
focuses not just on whether moral arguments are deployed but also on the
broad types of moral reasoning that can be characterized when one looks
beyond individual minds and psychological mechanisms and across diverse
cultures. Graham et al. (2011) position moralities as emerging through the
interactions of large numbers of people with each other, which are con-
strained and enabled by culturally and historically speciﬁc sets of institutions
and technologies (Graham et al. 2011). By approaching moral systems in this
way they bring into view a set of social and psychological foundations on
which diﬀerent cultures construct their moralities. These include harm and
care, fairness and reciprocity, in-group identity and loyalty, authority and
respect, and purity and sanctity (Haidt and Graham 2007).
Moral foundations theory thus provides a conceptual organization for
measuring and describing diﬀerences in moral concerns across individuals,
social groups, and cultures. Graham et al. (2011) have applied it in parti-
cular to understanding and explaining diﬀerences in engagement with
public policy issues according to political orientation. They suggested that
those of diﬀering political orientation (liberals and conservatives) identify
to greater and lesser degrees with diﬀerent moral foundations, resulting in
challenges for collective action that appeals to diﬀerent groups (Feygina
2013, Rossen et al., 2015).
Given variation according to political beliefs with regards to environ-
mental issues, moral foundations theory has since found application in
environmental and climate change research. For example, Feinberg and
Willer (2013) used moral foundations theory to analyze the moral argu-
ments used to persuade or legitimize action on climate change, and showed
that these appealed more to individuals of a liberal political direction than
conservatives. They explain this by showing that it is the types of moral
arguments that are used that create the divergence. Feinberg and Willer
(2013) suggest that most arguments on climate change are based on appeals
to the idea of ‘protection from harm’, either for the environment or for
vulnerable people. These harm-based and care-based forms of moral rea-
soning resonate more strongly with liberal political orientations than they
do with conservative positions.
Feinberg and Willer found, in the US context of their study, that con-
servative-leaning individuals articulated moral concerns in terms of respect
for authority and preservation of systems, patriotism, and ideas of sanctity
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and purity. Since these forms of moral argument were not as prevalent in
climate change media discourse as those that held more salience for liberals,
they argue that there is less tendency for conservatives to see it as a moral
issue. Feinberg and Willer argue that the speciﬁc types of moral reasoning
deployed therefore make a diﬀerence to support for and propensity to
undertake climate change action. This means that within climate mitigation
research, the moral foundations of support for political action have been
found to connect more strongly with liberal political orientations than more
conservative political positions.
As noted above, moral concerns have diﬀerent resonances in diﬀerent
social, political, and cultural contexts. The types of moral reasoning identi-
ﬁed by Feinberg and Willer have been shown to be present, but with very
diﬀerent expression, for example, in Finland. Vainio and Makiniemi (2016),
looking speciﬁcally at climate-friendly behavior, show that moral concerns
mediated reported actions and that people used multiple moral foundations
when interpreting climate change. Research to date that has tested and
applied moral foundations theory, in general argues for a change in com-
munications about climate change to position the issues in terms that have
relevance across a wider range of moral intuitions. For example, the moral
foundation of purity and sanctity appeals more to conservatives, and could
be aligned with arguments deployed to engender action on climate change.
So moral reasoning is not monolithic. Rather, it is multiple and is
deployed by diﬀerent groups, to diﬀerent ends. The implications of this
diversity for climate change adaptation are profound.
Moral reasoning for adaptation dilemmas: a conceptual framework
Studies of moral framing related to pro-environmental positions have
focused almost exclusively on issues of consumption and other actions
that induce environmental externalities. In the climate change arena, stu-
dies have therefore focused on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.
They have examined the moral underpinnings concerning motivations for
emission-reducing behavior (e.g. Feinberg and Willer 2013), or have exam-
ined issues of moral engagement with climate change more broadly (Hulme
2009). These ideas are equally relevant for examining climate change
adaptation: questions remain concerning what the moral arguments are
for adaptation and the extent to which they manifest through public
deliberations. Here we advance a typology of moral intuitions related to
climate adaptation (Table 1). It is based on prior descriptions of moral
foundations, and builds on signiﬁcant theory and evidence of the ethics and
social challenges of adaptation and social diﬀerentiation in vulnerability to
the impacts of climate change (Adger et al., 2009, Thomas and Twyman
2005, Dow et al. 2006, Paavola and Adger 2006, Graham et al. 2015).
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Previous research on moral foundations has largely been grounded in
quantitative research testing the relationship between moral foundations
and diﬀerent aspects of social action such as climate-friendly consump-
tion. Qualitative research interested in the role of moral positions for
engagement with climate change has been less prevalent. There are,
however, a small number of studies that have examined closely related
issues. For example, within climate justice research, Klinsky and collea-
gues (2012) examined how justice arguments diﬀer when the lay public
talk about fairness in mitigation (reducing emissions) and adaptation
(risks imposed on populations and investments to reduce these). Klinsky
showed that in discussing adaptation, arguments about ability, need, and
entitlement are stronger elements in deciding what is fair, than in
discussion on mitigation.
The typology in Table 1 distinguishes between two broad types of moral
arguments. We term these vulnerability-based moral arguments (aligned
with liberal positions) and system-based moral arguments (connected to
conservative orientations). Vulnerability-based arguments (Column 1) are
based on notions of the unfairness of imposing harm on others, on soli-
darity with those on whom harm has been imposed, and on the rightness of
protecting vulnerable populations according to ability and need. The vul-
nerability imperative has long been at the center of discussions on climate
change harm, based on the idea that special attention must be given to the
most vulnerable (Dow et al. 2006).
The system-based moral arguments in Table 1 (Column 2) concern
issues of respect for authority, and of duty and responsibility, not least to
country of citizenship (manifesting as patriotism) and fellow
citizens (Rossen et al., 2015). A further strand is the moral wrongness of
spoiling nature and the natural world. These diﬀering moral positions are
derived from moral foundations theory combined with insights from the
adaptation literature. Though we are not explicitly concerned with the
political orientation of the people within the empirical research, we are
interested more generally in the extent to which we ﬁnd these diﬀering
forms of moral engagement in discussion of adaptation more broadly, or if
one set of moral positions is more or less prevalent than the other.
Table 1. Vulnerability-based and system-based dimensions of moral positions on
climate change.
Vulnerability-based moral positions System-based moral positions
Solidarity Respect for authority
Ability, need, and entitlement Stability and system preservation
Fairness in burdens Duty and responsibility (e.g. to country through patriotism)
Protection from harm Sanctity, purity, and naturalness
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Public engagement with climate change adaptation
Most research in the area of public perceptions of adaptation to climate
change risks has typically focused on populations directly aﬀected. Much of
this work draws on contemporary exposure to risks such as ﬂooding,
wildﬁre, drought, and heat wave. Some focuses on the nature of vulner-
ability in aﬀected populations, their adaptive capacity and agency, and even
the impact of experience of weather on their willingness to undertake
mitigation and their environmental attitudes (Spence et al. 2011, Marshall
et al. 2012). Much less of this work focuses on general public attitudes,
irrespective of whether those individuals are directly at risk themselves.
The importance of investigating wider public perspectives on the risks of
climate change and views with regard to adaptive action is underpinned by a
number of linked imperatives. First, it has been shown that the eﬀectiveness of
strategies for adapting to climate change will depend in large a part on the
public acceptability of options (Adger et al. 2013). Second, because the regula-
tion of adaptation is likely to occur in domestic arenas, governance systems
and populations are deeply implicated in the development and deployment of
adaptation strategies (Klinsky et al. 2012). Third, there is evidence of existing
public conﬂict around proposed adaptation strategies such as resettlement,
ﬂood risk management, nature conservation, cultural heritage, and others.
Hence, public engagement is likely to be crucial in avoiding exacerbation of
such conﬂicts. Finally, echoing the conceptual and empirical arguments in
support of greater public engagement that have occurred in science and
technology studies, it has been asserted that it is vital to engage with members
of the public to ‘bring novel information or perspectives into the discussion’
(Klinsky et al. 2012: 863; Carmin and Dodman 2013).
We argue that it is important to examine the general political climate on
adaptation, because it raises issues of political legitimacy associated with action
on climate change and provides insights relevant to understanding public
engagement. Cash et al. (2002) discuss the importance of salience (how relevant
information is to decision-making bodies or publics) and legitimacy (how fair an
information producing process is and whether it considers appropriate values,
concerns, and perspectives of diﬀerent actors) for environmental decision-mak-
ing. Here, we provide insight regarding the ways that climate change adaptation
might be salient for diﬀerent publics (i.e. in terms of diﬀerent moral intuitions)
and highlight public values, concerns, and perspectives that are important for
understanding the legitimacy of diﬀerent responses.
Context, design, and methods
The analysis focuses on whether diﬀerent forms of moral reasoning present
in discussions among the UK public concerning climate change adaptation?
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Where moral reasoning is present, we examine which dominant themes and
types of moral framing are prevalent or appear to be most salient. In the
UK the political focus on adaptation is institutionalized within the Climate
Change Act of 2008, which as well as setting obligations for decarboniza-
tion, also has responsibility for assessing risks and in eﬀect making the UK
climate-ready. Hence, climate change adaptation in the UK is, in policy
circles, understood as a set of obligations on government departments
around risk.
The data were derived from a set of facilitated discussion groups on
climate change risks and adaptation undertaken in the UK during 2013.
The focus groups were commissioned by the UK Government Department
for Environment Food and Rural Aﬀairs (Defra) as part of their processes for
developing the UK’s National Adaptation Plan to meet obligations under the
Climate Change Act. Defra commissioned a structured representative sample
survey of individuals using mainly closed-ended questions, implemented by
IPSOS-MORI (participant n = 2,007) alongside 14 qualitative facilitated
discussion groups (participant n = 148). The discussion groups were imple-
mented across a total of 13 locations (including 2 in Scotland, 2 in Wales, and
1 in Northern Ireland), varied by the extent to which they were urban or
rural and their exposure to climate risks. Participants were sampled to ensure
a mix of age, gender, and social grade across the group discussions (see Ipsos
MORI Research Institute 2013).
Analysis of the data from the nationally representative survey of indivi-
duals by Taylor et al. (2014) focused on how experience of extreme weather,
such as ﬂooding within the respondents’ area, aﬀected how they perceived
the seriousness of climate change, and showed that indeed weather-related
hazards did aﬀect climate change attitudes. That analysis used data from
closed-ended questions from the individual survey and hence does not
reveal underlying attitudes or reasoning. For the current analysis, we were
given access to the recordings of the discussion groups and had a subset of
them transcribed to allow for detailed analysis. The subset selected was
based partly on the location of the groups and partly on the quality of the
recordings themselves. Additionally, some group discussions were not
recorded, so we could not access all 13 groups. The subset of the groups
that we were able to have transcribed included those in Belfast, Bristol,
Birmingham, London, and Brighton (participant n = 57).
Here, we present the ﬁrst detailed analysis of the qualitative discussion group
dataset; ours is one of only a handful that examines national data from UK
publics on climate change adaptation. The data were collected and designed to
explore lay perceptions of adaptation to climate change, and participants were
encouraged and prompted to talk through their logic and positions: hence the
data are highly suitable for analysis of the underlying reasoning, and have been
coded to meet that objective. There are clearly challenges in analysis of open-
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ended qualitative data not focused on speciﬁc themes intended by those that
collected the data (Hoﬀerth 2005). But we interrogate the data through a speciﬁc
analytical lens, seeking to squeeze every ounce of explanation from this rich
source (Bryman 2008, Shirani et al. 2013).
The transcripts were analyzed utilizing a bottom-up thematic approach
whereby codes (or prevalent themes) were derived from readings of the
material (see Denzin and Lincoln 1998). The research team identiﬁed the
presence of moral reasoning within the discussion groups through this
initial coding. A second in-depth coding interrogated the data focusing
on how issues around adaptation were articulated within diﬀerent moral
frames. This second phase involved an iterative process of categorization
derived from the literature to identify moral arguments, while still allowing
for alternative or new forms of moral reasoning to emerge from the data.
Through this process, the analysis highlights the relevance of diﬀerent types
of moral reasoning for engagement with climate adaptation.
The analysis opens up insights into processes of moral reasoning about
adaptation among lay publics. The analysis is novel, because ﬁrst, there is
limited existing research on the general political climate or social mood
relating to adaptation, and second, dimensions of moral reasoning within
public discourse about adaptation have been neglected within climate
change research more broadly.
Results: public discourse, adaptation, and moral reasoning
Through this section, we examine the relative prevalence of diﬀerent types
of moral reasoning in the context of adaptation and explore what this might
mean for implementing legitimate governance of adaptation. We contex-
tualize this through reference to the table and typology of forms of moral
reasoning introduced in Table 1. In Table 2, we oﬀer example statements to
give insight into the forms of reasoning that we found across the groups. In
what follows, we unpack these diﬀerent types of moral discourse with
reference to illustrative examples from the data.
The discussion group data reveal the prevalence of a wide range of
moral arguments spanning the vulnerability-based and system-based
spectrum. Much vulnerability-based discussion focused on solidarity,
protection from harm, and fairness in burdens. Discourse encompassed
diﬀerent dimensions of these vulnerability-based beliefs. For example,
notions of solidarity were revealed in part through talk about the need
to protect populations from climate risks across diﬀerent groups and
regions. Discussions, in this sense, revealed sensitivity to social and
geographical scale within the adaptation dilemma. Participants in
London, for example, when confronted with a dilemma over their local
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 9
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versus national priorities, emphasized the interdependence of decisions
and ideals of the ‘greater good’:
Facilitator: That’s an interesting point, as Londoners, would you rather spend
the money on [the Thames barrier and ﬂood protection for London] or on
agriculture generally for the whole country? What do you think is the most
important?
Participant: The greater good, so there will be agriculture for the whole
country [Participant 8, London].
Discussion of how to understand and characterize climate impacts also
revealed signiﬁcant solidarity with others. Participants articulated ideas
that to some extent sit at odds with policy assessments of risk, with people
highlighting vulnerability, and the extent of eﬀects on even small numbers
of people as important:
A minor eﬀect on a lot of people we put as sort of a big impact, a large eﬀect
on a smaller amount of people is also a big impact [Participant 2, Brighton].
This contrasts with policy assessments that situate risk in terms of like-
lihood and consequences calculated in primarily economic terms, and thus
favoring protection of larger numbers over the extent of the impact. In the
discussions the issue was reformulated in moral rather than economic
terms meaning that large eﬀects on small numbers were given greater
weight than is the case in current policy.
Many discussions highlighted issues of solidarity in responses to climate
impacts, referencing the importance of social cohesion. For instance, parti-
cipants noted that climate change adaptation was likely experienced as
disruption through extreme events, and that in these circumstances social
cohesion comes to the fore. In one instance, this was articulated by making
an analogy with terrorist attacks in London.
I don’t think that people in local areas mind sticking together in rough times,
like when the bombs went oﬀ, people did stick together in times of adversity
but I think it’s wrong when the rich are getting richer and the poor are
getting poorer, to make the poor pay more, it just doesn’t make sense
[Participant 4, London].
This quote not only highlights the relevance of solidarity-based principles
in discourse about climate adaptation issues but also raises the ability of
populations to pay, and hence ethical questions about the distribution of
costs and beneﬁts, such as the placing and prioritization of ﬂood defenses.
In this context, fairness in burdens and protection from harm formed core
principles, with the allocation of limited resources to protection from
climate risks being discussed in terms of the vulnerability of diﬀerent
social groups (e.g. rich and poor) and at diﬀerent times of life (e.g. young
and old).
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. . . someone like that for example probably wouldn’t have home insurance, I
don’t have home insurance because I can’t aﬀord it and I can imagine it’s the
same for people who are on beneﬁts, if their homes were ﬂooded and they
didn’t have home insurance, that would be everything that they owned just
gone. And then how would they, on the income they’ve got, aﬀord to then
replace everything? [Participant 11, Birmingham]
For me though . . . I’m not doing it from a selﬁsh point of view, because I
teach new generations, I see it as what impact it’s going to have on them . . .
[Participant 1, Brighton].
Participants’ articulations of moral positions that related to fairness in
burdens connected closely to perspectives on ability, need, and entitlement.
Fairness was related to views on the capacity of diﬀerent groups to respond
and adapt to change themselves, with those situated as less capable being
positioned as in greater need of support:
Participant: The impacts on vulnerable people. I think that’s very important.
Facilitator: Who do you count as vulnerable?
Participant: Elderly, disabled . . .. young . . . Because they’re more capable of
looking after themselves, an elderly person isn’t [Participant 1, Birmingham].
Vulnerability-based perspectives and discourse-entailed recognition of
the dilemmas associated with positions on adaptation embedded in notions
of solidarity:
I would like to see, most people would, put them [ﬂood defences] by the old
people’s houses . . . But they don’t all live in one area . . . [Participant 8,
London].
The reasoning concerns the spatial distribution of impacts: vulnerable
populations are dispersed. But participants also raised questions about
how to deﬁne and characterize the vulnerable:
Also when it comes to the rich being able to look after themselves, where is the
cut-oﬀ point? There are always going to be . . . people who may be property rich
but don’t actually have any cash. Or people who are just on the boundary, who
are just a bit too much, so still don’t have enough to spend their way out of it but
also don’t get any money to help with it so . . . [Participant 3, Bristol].
In this respect, there was recognition in public discourse of the diﬃculties
associated with making judgments about who is vulnerable with respect to
climate adaptation. Clearly embedded within this kind of discursive reasoning
there are core forms of moral reasoning about fairness, vulnerability, protection,
and diﬀerential capabilities to respond to climate impacts. In previous research,
these forms of moral intuition have been highlighted as those that are given
primacy in discourse about climate changemitigation (Feinberg andWiller 2013,
Vainio and Makiniemi 2016). Here, we not only show their relevance for public
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engagement with climate adaptation but we also found forms of system-based
moral reasoning about the issues.
System-based moral intuitions, as deﬁned above, coexist in the data
alongside the focus on vulnerability-based forms of moral reasoning. The
issues of responsibility, of respect for and trust in authorities, and of doing
the right thing by the country or for nature (sanctity, system preservation,
and patriotism), are apparent across the group discussions. Participants
articulated the need for governments to act to adapt to climate change.
Yet, the underlying moral position on this topic emphasizes the common
good and the perceived legitimacy of adaptation decisions taken through
democratic governments. Such sentiments are articulated thus:
The way I see it is when you pay tax, you put your trust in the government,
whether you trust them or not, it’s trusting in the government to allocate
those funds for the general greater good [emphasis added] [Participant 4,
London].
Yeah we’re responsible, we’re responsible for it but at the end of the day as an
individual my one little . . . makes no diﬀerence really, it’s the government
that is eventually going to have to make the decisions that aﬀect all of us and
it’s our responsibility to sort of vote in a way that we feel we should go but . . .
regardless of how we feel, they make the decisions, not us [Participant 5,
Brighton].
Much discussion on responsibility for action focused on the duties of
individuals and of governments, including the importance of regulations,
systems, and economic processes. For example, when discussing heat wave
risks and adaptation, participants grappled with the extent to which indi-
viduals could take precautions, and highlighted the role of government
regulations, particularly in ensuring vulnerable populations are not exposed
to risk:
I do think the government should do something if these are the ﬁgures and
like this is what they’ve been told and that realistically they need to think
about . . . I think in a way, for the hot weather, people can also buy their own,
the majority of people can buy their own fans and they can sort of under-
stand that hot weather, you need to take certain precautions . . . But when
they’re building social housing now, they should think about the fact that
maybe this could be an issue so make them ﬂood proof and put some more
vents in so it’s . . . those kinds of steps [Participant 6, London].
The issue of duty and responsibility in system-based moral articulations of
the adaptation challenge was less prevalent than solidarity discussions
across the groups. Yet, discussions frequently highlighted the issues of
moral hazard: government action inadvertently increases personal risk by
drawing down collective risk. Much discussion of a moral hazard in adap-
tation, though not using those words, focused on the beneﬁts of market
signals and individual responsibility to act within economic systems. For
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 13
example, one participant highlighted how market processes could ulti-
mately lead to solutions for coastal erosion:
Everyone’s going to hate me for saying this but I think that is also an
acceptable solution because I think that eventually people do take responsi-
bility for their actions and they will see, ‘right, the coast is eroding, let’s not
live there’ and then the market will sort itself out and corporations will invest
in irrigation, in nicer whatever that is, urban areas [Participant 4, London].
This quote is indicative of the position that it is morally acceptable to do
nothing and allow the market to deliver a solution. Such forms of reasoning
on adaptation appeal to intuitions of individual duty, respect for authority,
and system preservation. Sanctity and purity of nature as well as patriotism
– manifest as relating to the protection of British identity or cultural assets
– also ran through public discourse:
. . . people care enough about . . . things like complete loss of protected
habitats, you won’t get that back or like losing native species, that’s
irreversible.
[Participant 3, Bristol]
Participant: Protecting national ancient ruins and that, sometimes are on
coastal lines, obviously with erosion and whatever.
Facilitator: So sort of heritage, things we might lose, important things. Why
is that important to keep?
Participant: I like keeping in touch with heritage . . . [Participant 4, Bristol].
Overall the analysis reveals how varied forms of moral reasoning are
deployed in discussions of climate change adaptation. They include both
system-based forms of reasoning, highlighted as resonating more strongly
with those of conservative political orientation, and vulnerability-based rea-
soning. Though we have not sought to distinguish between diﬀerent political
positions, through this analysis we have been able to identify the relevance of
multiple forms of moral reasoning for public engagement with climate
change adaptation. This suggests an important role for moral frames in
engaging people with climate change adaptation as much as mitigation.
Discussion
The analysis demonstrates the diversity of types of moral reasoning that are
deployed in discussing climate change adaptation. But the data also under-
scores how risks are frequently, and often dominantly, framed in public talk
as moral issues rather than issues of economic rationality, likelihood, or
individual concern. The participants, when asked to deliberate about the
risks of climate change and potential adaptation policies and strategies,
articulated these dilemmas in moral terms, crucially using both vulnerabil-
ity-based and system-based arguments.
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The observed emphasis on moral arguments in adaptation provides
evidence and gives comfort to those advocates, and indeed philosophers
and communications experts, that focus on morality as the key to solving
the climate change problem. Most of that literature highlights how the vast
majority of discussions on climate change within public policy are focused
on economic arguments about present and future costs, and bemoans the
lack of emphasis on moral dimensions, as well as critiquing policies that
rely on extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivations for potential action
(Corner and Randall 2011, Crompton 2011).
The ﬁndings also support an emphasis on the diﬀerent kinds of moral
foundations that could form a basis for galvanizing action about climate
change. Feinberg and Willer (2013) highlight how framing climate change
as a moral issue has important implications for engagement with the issues,
while also showing that climate communications are typically grounded in
particular moral foundations, rather than more diverse forms. Jamieson
(2007) argues that the moral distance between cause and consequence can
only be resolved through new ethics and duties of care for the human and
nonhuman world, while Gardiner (2010) hints that empathy and recogni-
tion of the human causes are central to implementing climate justice.
The dominance and diversity of moral frames for adaptation shown in the
analysis have signiﬁcant implications for governance. There is, for example, the
potential for vulnerability-based motivations to increase levels of support for
recovery processes and adaptation measures. Several examples of this were
evident during the 2013/2014 winter ﬂoods across the UK. Direct support for
recovery in agricultural areas aﬀected by ﬂoods was seen through initiatives
such as Forage Aid that channeled donated animal feed from farms across the
UK to ﬂooded farms in Somerset. Many people from across aﬀected and
unaﬀected regions in the UK volunteered their time to help those directly
aﬀected in ﬂooded areas. Similarly, there are widespread expressions of soli-
darity for ﬂood victims or populations aﬀected by wildﬁre, documented for
example in the case of the Brisbane ﬂoods of 2011 (Wickes et al. 2015).
Solidarity also ﬁnds expression in public policy arenas and demands for action.
In the UK, examples of vulnerability-based moral intuitions saw people sup-
port campaigns for the release of extra national funds to undertake ﬂood
prevention measures following the 2013/2014 winter ﬂoods, beyond those
that had previously been allowed under policy and cost-beneﬁt rules.
System-based moral reasoning, by contrast, has greater resonance with
those policies aimed at prevention of impacts, and protection of sovereign
territory and nature. The discussion of climate change impacts at a global
scale is increasingly articulated as a threat to national security interests of
states, and to a lesser degree of human security. There are inevitably
signiﬁcant critiques of the securitization of such debates (Oels 2013). Yet,
the need for precautionary action for the protection of citizens and the
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emphasis on beneﬁts within nations appeals to more system-based forms of
moral reasoning, such as duty and care.
Are the results robust? Or are the results speciﬁc to the UK? First, the
UK context means that the types and impacts of climate change are speciﬁc
to the geographical setting. Perceived diﬀerences between risks for the UK
meant that focus group participants, when asked, almost exclusively ranked
and prioritized ﬂoods over heat risks. Part of the explanation is related to
the timing of the focus groups: winter weather and concurrent ﬂoods in UK
inevitably inﬂuenced these perceptions. Capstick et al. (2015), on reexamin-
ing data on UK public attitudes over the past 15 years, found that the
relative importance of climate change as an area of concern has shifted over
time, while the underlying discussions of climate change as a moral issue
are more stable. We suggest therefore that within the geographical context,
the results of our analysis are at least conﬁrmed by other evidence.
But is the UK a special case? A signiﬁcant amount of research on public
attitudes to climate change (though not necessarily on moral dimensions)
has focused on the UK and the US. Lorenzoni et al. (2006), for example,
found signiﬁcant diﬀerences between public acceptance of climate change
as a reality and as a concern. Tvinnereim and Fløttum (2015) by contrast
found that public discourse on climate change in Norway emphasizes social
dimensions over economic dimensions, unlike in the US and the UK
studies. So we cannot conclude emphatically that the speciﬁc ﬁndings on
about adaptation topics would be widespread and universal. Yet the result
certainly resonates with ﬁndings from Norway and elsewhere where the
contexts for the dimensions of moral talk are highly diverse.
Conclusions
Previous research has highlighted the relevance of moral framings for
action on climate change. It has focused primarily on salience of the topic
and links to general pro-environmental behavior. Here, we have interro-
gated for the ﬁrst time the forms of moral reasoning within public discourse
on issues of the potential impacts of climate change. We ﬁnd, crucially, a
diversity of moral positions expressed on climate-related risks and the
options for adaptation, but with a dominance of vulnerability-based articu-
lations of moral reasoning.
We suggest, therefore, in line with moral foundations theory, that moral
reasoning has public policy implications. The results presented here have
important implications for the governance of adaptation, not least in the
political legitimacy of diﬀerent strategies. Despite the diversity of moral
reasoning, vulnerability-based motivations, as we deﬁne them here, have
high salience and are prevalent in public discourse. This suggests that the
public is more likely to give support for policies that invest in marginal
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areas, even at higher cost. Similarly, such motivations are more likely to
lend legitimacy to a focus on vulnerability as the key parameter for prior-
itizing action. This is relevant both for local-level decisions and invest-
ments, as it is globally.
The results resonate with emerging theory and evidence on the govern-
ance challenges of adaptation. First, the salience and legitimacy of adapta-
tion strategies and policies are clearly determined by public awareness and
acceptability. Where societies recognize that the impacts of climate change
are harmful and will be imposed on groups who do not deserve it within
those societies, there is often the demand for policy change and a renego-
tiation of responsibilities of public and private actors in dealing with the
risks (cf. Adger et al. 2013). The ﬁndings of this study suggest that demand
for change will likely be articulated through moral terms, such as the
recognition of the need for solidarity and fair distribution of the economic
burdens of adapting to risks such as ﬂooding.
This research ﬁnally highlights the relevance of moral intuitions for those
experiencing the real impacts of climate change for public responses, going
beyond a focus on mitigation. In particular, we show that there is scope to
engage people with climate change adaptation by mobilizing diverse forms of
moral reasoning and frames. The scope of climate justice is therefore
expanded: on the basis of this evidence, climate change is perceived and
understood to extend beyond pro-environmental behavior to the impacts
and potential adaptations as moral issues. Such moral reasoning could form
the basis of public support for adaptation as well as wider engagement with
climate change as the implications for others become apparent.
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